Linguistic Interactions between the East and the West: The Continuity and Transformation of Linguistic Identity in Japan

Naoko Hosokawa

Abstract

This paper considers the development of Japanese identity through the linguistic interaction between ‘East’ and ‘West’. Language constitutes an essential part of one's identity, and the view on a national language typically mirrors the desired visions of national characteristics articulated in the society. At the same time, language is also continually in flux with influences from other cultures and civilisations. The treatment of external linguistic elements is, therefore, reflective of the manner in which the image of a nation is negotiated in relation to the external world at any given moment in time. To examine the evolution of Japanese national identity, this article reviews the development of language-related discussions, focusing on the treatment of ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ linguistic elements at four ‘milestone’ moments in the country’s recent history. This paper argues that the ‘Eastern-Western’ discourse has been an essential part of Japanese society in terms of both its linguistic identity and the overall perception of Japan’s relation to the rest of the world. Furthermore, the concepts of ‘East’ and ‘West’ have been an enduring pillar in the construction of linguistic identity in Japan, despite the tremendous transformations that Japanese society has undergone. By illuminating a historical continuity in the efforts to define ‘Japaneseness’ through a contrast of external influences that are psychologically categorised into ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ concepts, the paper proposes a notional framework for understanding debates on language and identity in Japan.

Keywords: Japan, Asia, East and West, National identity, Language policy

Naoko Hosokawa is a Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellow at the European University Institute. She obtained a PhD in Oriental Studies from the University of Oxford in 2015. She also holds an M.Sc. in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, an M.A. in Political Science from Columbia University, and a B.A. in Policy Management from Keio University. Her main fields of research are sociolinguistics and media discourse analysis related to the question of national and regional identity. She was previously an invited researcher at the French Network for Asian Studies, CNRS France, and the France-Japan Foundation, EHESS Paris. Her recent publications include articles on Ethnicity and Nationalism, and Myths in Crisis: The Crisis of Myth.
1. Introduction

The notion of an East-West division of the world is long-standing. In Japan, the discourse on the Eastern and Western worlds and their interactions has notably played a central role in negotiating national identity. However, the sheer physical distance between the occidental and oriental spheres is much less significant today as a result of internationalisation and globalisation, blurring this traditional classification of the world, diversifying values, and transforming identities. Since Giddens pointed out that geographical proximity was no longer essential for communal unity in the so-called ‘high modern’ period, the development of communication technologies has evolved further. The world is now being transformed into ‘a single global system’, as Chan observes. While such a convergence is a reality, the growing homogeneity it induces is accompanied by a search for distinctive national or regional identities. In such a context, the East-West division of the world continues to play an essential discursive role. Taking a case study of Japan, this paper will argue that the imagined dichotomy between the East and West has been one of the central pillars in the construction of national identity since early modern times to date, although its significations have drastically changed over time.

In order to substantiate this hypothesis, this paper will examine discussions related to the ‘national language’ at four distinct junctures in the recent history of Japan: 1) the sakoku (self-imposed closure) policy and the emergence of the kokugaku (Japanese national studies) movement in the pre-Meiji period, 2) the intensification of language reform debates to establish a ‘modern’ and ‘standard’ Japanese after the Meiji Restoration, 3) the rise of politically-induced linguistic nationalism towards and during the Pacific War period, and 4) the popularisation of nihonjinron (theories of Japanese uniqueness) in the post-war period and the return of criticism directed at Western loanwords. A particular focus will be placed on the treatment of Eastern (mainly Chinese) and Western (mainly European and American) influences on the language. As language is often seen as a national symbol, it is believed that the analysis of language-related discussions will reveal critical notions surrounding national identity. Furthermore, controversies on Eastern and Western linguistic influence can be interpreted as cultural, social, and political oscillations between Eastern and Western value systems as represented and symbolised by language. By looking at the four moments over this extended period of time, the paper aims to reveal both the transformations and continuities in the national identity discourse in Japan, providing keys to understanding contemporary Japanese conceptions of language and culture.

2. Interaction between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’

In this paper, the principal framework of analysis is the distinction between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’, the two essential notions of identity. Cohen pointed out that “boundaries are relational rather than absolute,” emphasising that identity of Self is built in relation to an ‘Other’. Put simply, in order to imagine what the ‘Self’ is, it is essential to have an ‘Other’ to it. Based on this idea, it will be argued that the contrast between ‘East’ and ‘West’ has been the conceptual base in defining ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ in the recent history of Japan.

---

although whether the ‘Self’ is identified with ‘East’ or ‘West’ has depended on the political and social context.

In considering national identity, the concepts of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ are linked to the notions of ‘national’ and ‘foreign’. The examination of what is seen to be the national language, therefore, reveals the characteristics and values that are associated with the national identity, while putatively ‘foreign’ linguistic elements represent ‘Otherness’. It is worth pointing out that the language debates examined in this article are principally normative discussions on ideas surrounding language rather than considerations of the actual use of language. Therefore, the central focus of the debates has predominantly been on written language, which tends to be the subject of normative and prescriptive discussions more frequently than spoken language due to its more tangible characteristics. While illuminating the recent evolution of Japanese identity, the analysis of the Eastern-Western discourse in this paper can also be applied to understand contemporary debates on language in Japan, such as views on the knowledge of Chinese characters or the use of Western loanwords.

3. First Case: Sakoku policy and the emergence of the kokugaku movement

The kokugaku movement in the Edo period (1603-1868) constitutes one of the key milestones in the development of the idea of ‘national language’ as well as the general national consciousness in Japan. In the early seventeenth century, the Tokugawa shogunate government issued a series of edicts to ban foreign ships from entering Japanese ports, except for restricted Chinese, Korean and Dutch traders who were permitted passage to the Dejima island under the so-called sakoku policy. Thus, for the majority of the Edo period, external influence upon Japanese society was tightly constrained, with heavy penalties for those who attempted to enter or leave the country. The purpose of this policy was to establish a stable centralised state that was free from foreign influence and interference. The policy was in effect until 1853 and, to a large extent, achieved self-contained stability in Japan, thereby giving domestic culture the opportunity to flourish. Even though it is difficult to determine true public attitudes towards foreign influences under such a strict ban, some of the literature of the time provides insights into how Eastern and Western influences were viewed during this period.

3.1. Views on the Western elements

While contact with the West was limited to Dutch trade, a small element of the Japanese population did have a sophisticated knowledge of European languages and civilisations. Paramore affirmed that ‘throughout the Tokugawa period private intellectuals and doctors showed great enthusiasm for foreign culture and technology, including those from the West’. Scholars were notably engaged in translating European books into Japanese within the framework of so-called rangaku (Dutch studies). For example, the medical scholar Sugita Genpaku studied Dutch medicine and translated a German book on anatomy (Anatomische Tabellen) from Dutch (Ontleedkundige Tafelen) into Japanese as Kaitai Shinsho (New Book on Anatomy). Sugita was convinced of the superior accuracy of the Dutch anatomical studies in comparison to the Chinese books that were previously known in Japan.

---

However, in his *Rangaku Kotohajime* (Dawn of Western Science in Japan), Sugita consciously denied any revolutionary intentions towards the country’s social order by stating: “All I wanted was to show somehow to the people that the real structure of the human body was different from the one described in Chinese books. I had no other intention in my enterprise”. This suggests that he was aware that public admiration of the West was seen as taboo at the time. It is also important to note that, during the majority of the *sakoku* period, reading or writing European languages was strictly forbidden despite the trade relations with the Dutch and the presence of Dutch learning. Thus, according to Sugita, Dutch translators were not allowed to write or read Dutch and were accordingly obliged to take notes in *kana* (Japanese phonetic syllabaries) to record what Dutch traders said or to learn it by heart in order to carry out their duties. Publishing a book with a printed alphabet was also forbidden. The wholesale banning of Western languages, thus, aptly symbolises the general attitude to Western influence in the Japan of the time.

### 3.2. Views on the Eastern elements

With regard to Eastern influence, the Japanese language had already imported a great amount of vocabulary from Chinese by the time of the *sakoku* policy. There was a large influx of Chinese vocabulary along with Chinese characters mainly in the Nara (710-794) and Heian (794-1185) periods, which influenced both the rules of word formation and the grammatical structure of the Japanese language. Even during the closure period, *kangaku* (Chinese studies) and *kanbun* (Chinese writing) enjoyed a special privilege, remaining essential to the elite’s education. *Kanbun kundoku* (the tradition of rendering Chinese texts into Japanese by annotating the text with diacritics and numbers) had also long been practised as part of it. The Japanese, at least its elite population, were, thus, well aware of the history by which Japan had imported many aspects of its culture from China. It was, therefore, not the case that admiration of Chinese civilisation was prohibited in the manner that it was with regard to Western civilisation.

Nevertheless, a distinction between Chinese and Japanese things persisted in the eyes of some intellectuals. Having seen the overwhelming impact China had on the Japanese culture and language, a group of scholars questioned Japan’s dependence on Chinese civilisation and engaged in Japanese nativist studies known as *kokugaku* in an attempt to promote indigenous scholarship that was independent of Chinese influence. Leading figures in the *kokugaku* studies include Motoori Norinaga, Kamo no Mabuchi, Kada no Azumamaro, and Hirata Atsutane, and they called for the appreciation of native Japanese literature such as *Kojiki* (*Records of Ancient Matters, 712*), *Nihon Shoki* (*The Chronicles of Japan, 720*), and *Genji Monogatari* (*The Tale of Genji, early eleventh century*). For the *kokugaku* scholars, Chinese words, concepts, and syntax corrupted the authenticity and the originality of the Japanese language. Emphasising the tight bonds between language, culture, and thought, the *kokugaku* scholars aspired to revive *yamato gokoro* (authentic Japanese sensibility) as contrasted to *kara gokoro* (Chinese sensibility).

Alongside the emergence of the *kokugaku* movement was a revival of the belief in *kotodama* (the spirit of language). This belief originated in the ancient Shintoist practice of

---

8 Motoori authored *Kojikiten*, 44 volumes of commentaries on *Kojiki*.
invocation, in which “beautiful words, correctly pronounced, were believed to bring about good whereas ugly words or beautiful words incorrectly pronounced were believed to cause evil”\(^{11}\) and where ‘beautiful words’ were associated with “proper Japanese” native words (yamatokotoba). Thus, under the ancient belief of kotodama, Chinese vocabulary was to be eschewed, as it was believed that “the kotodama lodges only within Yamato words”.\(^{12}\) The kokugaku scholars referred to the kotodama belief by focusing on the yamatokotoba to support their objective of establishing Japanese scholarship independent from Chinese influence. In 1695, Keichū, one of the founding scholars of kokugaku, pointed out the fact that, in Japan’s oldest poetic collection, Man’yōshū (Collection of Ten Thousand Leaves, 759), the writing of the word kotodama interchangeably used the Chinese characters for ‘word’ (言) and ‘thing’ (事), both of which are pronounced ‘koto’, emphasising the belief of the power of language to create reality\(^{13,14}\). Ito\(^{15}\) explains the kotodama belief as an assertion of Yamato against Kara (China), which would explain why the reference to kotodama was mainly used by Man’yōshū poets in their poems about kentōshi (Japanese missions to China). However, Miller\(^{16}\) pointed to the fact that the kokugaku reinvention of the kotodama myth was, in itself, heavily influenced by Chinese philology.

### 3.3. East-West and Self-Other discourse

From the above observations, we can submit that there were two competing views with regard to the external linguistic influence in pre-Meiji Japan, which can arguably be taken as a proxy for the wider prevailing attitudes towards foreign influences at the time. Despite the attraction of Western knowledge, the use of Western languages was seen as taboo as a result of the strict closure policy and a growing perception that Western civilisation represented a threat to Japan. The idea of the West was closely associated with ‘foreignness’, thus constituting Japan’s Other. From this point of view, the Eastern (Chinese) influence was seen as more familiar, and the use of Chinese language remained prestigious. Nevertheless, there was a certain consciousness of ‘Japanese’ language and culture, as opposed to the Chinese influence, which resulted in the emergence of nativist studies, giving the Eastern linguistic elements a split identity, partially Self and partially Other. However, at this point, it was difficult for a uniform linguistic identity to cohere, as there was a wide gap between the written scholarly and administrative language that was heavily influenced by Chinese and the spoken vernacular language in its abundant regional variations. Thus, the notion of ‘national language’, as well as the notion of a nation itself, had not yet been established in Japan.

---

\(^{15}\) Haku Ito, “Manyōjin to Kotodama” [The people of the time of Manyōshū and the kotodama belief], in *Manyōshū Kōza* [Lecture on Manyōshū], edited by Senichi Hisamatsu (Tokyo: Yōseido Shuppan, 1973), 46-53.
4. Second Case: The intensification of language reform debates

While the kokugaku movement evidenced a budding national consciousness in Japan, it is in the Meiji period that national sentiment grew rapidly within the framework of the modern nation-state with “a much more ambitious and totalling vision of ‘Japaneseness’”17 and an “outburst of nation-mindedness”.18 Commodore Perry’s famous ‘Black Ship’ of arrived at Uraga Port in 1853, leading to the opening of the country and the Meiji Restoration of 1868. The encounter with the Western world led to rapid transformation and social upheaval in Japan in the following decades. Together with the influx of Western civilisation, a large number of loanwords came into Japanese both as loan translations (calques) and direct loans.

The idea of the modern nation-state was also introduced at this time, and the standardisation of the Japanese language became an integral part of the nation-building project. Both practical and symbolic reasons recommended the establishment of a national language. Practically speaking, it was necessary for the wider population to have access to the written language in order to raise the educational level and establish a modern democratic society. Symbolically, the Japanese national language was also expected to serve as the emblem of the newly established identity of Japan. However, the issue of language standardisation would become a particularly controversial one, in particular with regards to the existing writing system’s extensive use of kanji (Chinese characters). Some argued for their abolition, others proposed their limitation, while others insisted on their preservation19.

As a result, the initiative to reform the national language saw much slower progress than most of the other modernisation projects during the same period, with the result being that the reduction and partial simplification of kanji and the adoption of the genbun itchi style was only partially achieved20 in the period after the Second World War.

4.1. Views on the Western elements

The language reform debates during the Meiji period were closely associated with the modernity discourse. Joseph21 claimed that “most of those giving up their traditional language [did] so as part of constructing an identity for themselves that [was] bound up with a conception of modernity as communication extending beyond their village and their country”. Those who supported reform proposals, notwithstanding their other differences, broadly shared the vision they associated with the Western languages. The first formal proposal to the government to reform the writing style came from Maejima Hisoka, a government translator of Dutch and English, in 1866. Maejima proposed a comprehensive reform to an all-kana script as well as to the genbun itchi style of writing. In his Opinion on the improvement of national orthography and national writing, he argued for the value of the abolition of kanji and the non-vernacularised writing system in shortening the time necessary to learn writing and, thereby, affording more time to educate people in science as

19 Proposals in the script reform debates can be classified into five groups: 1) to abolish kanji and use an all-kana script, 2) to abolish kanji and use an all-alphabet script, 3) to abolish kanji and to adopt a newly invented script, 4) to limit the use of kanji, and 5) to preserve the use of kanji (Hayakawa 2007:209-10).
20 It should be also pointed out that the genbun itchi has yet to be fully achieved to date. For example, the civil law still uses bungo-tai (literary writing different from the vernacular form), the reforms of which will be adopted only in 2020. Website of the Ministry of Justice. Available at: http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJII/minji06_001070000.html [accessed on 30.11.2017]
in the Western countries, in addition to which it would be easier to translate Western books into Japanese\(^{22}\).

A number of scholars, especially those who had studied in Europe, followed Maejima in advocating script reforms based on the concept of modern Western linguistics\(^ {23} \). Fukuzawa Yukichi was among those who supported the language reform proposal. With the aspiration to spread the values of Western civilisation to as many countrymen as possible through books written in an accessible style,\(^ {24} \) he proposed that the use of kanji should be reduced to around one thousand characters so as to make the written language accessible to all. This proposal was supported by Yano Fumio, a student of Fukuzawa, and the outcome of the language reform was closest to their proposal. Members of the general public also supported language reform and multiple organisations came into being, including the *Kana no kai* (Kana society), which promoted an all-\(kana\) script, and the *Rōmaji kai* (Roman alphabet society), which advocated the use of the alphabet. The reform ideas also inspired literary circles and a number of novelists attempted to pen their own works in the vernacularised style, such as Futabatei Shimei and his 1887 novel *Ukigumo* as well as Yamada Bimyō and his novel *Musashino*.

Another leading figure in script reform debates was Mori Arinori. Having returned to Japan following many years in the United Kingdom and the United States, Mori was particularly radical with his suggestion in 1873 that the language of Japan should be altogether replaced by English. Mori later became Minister of Education in 1886 and shared his idea to adopt Roman letters as the Japanese writing system with an American linguist William Dwight Whitney at Yale University in the following letter. It is noteworthy that Mori saw the existing Japanese writing system as ‘Chinese’ while expecting Roman letters to be ‘our own language’.

> “All the schools the Empire has had, for many centuries, have been Chinese; and strange to state, we have had no schools nor books in our own language for educational purposes [...]. The only course to be taken, to secure the desired end, is to start anew, by first phonetic principle. It is contemplated that Roman letters should be adopted.”\(^ {25} \)

The Meiji debates suggest that Maejima, Fukuzawa, and Mori, and other supporters of language reform, associated phonetic and vernacularised writing with the modernity and Western civilisation to which they were trying to assimilate Japan. As the slogan *Datsua Nyūō* (getting out of Asia, entering Europe) symbolises, their language reform proposals were based on the idea that Japan should catch up with Western civilisation and join the group of ‘modern’ nations by adopting a ‘modern’ writing system. They associated the existing writing style with Eastern tradition and the image of feudalism and backwardness from which they were trying to emancipate Japan. This view was institutionally supported by the *Kokugo Chōsaiinkai* (National Language Investigation Committee) that founded in 1902 by Ueda Kazutoshi, who studied linguistics in Germany. Through their proposals to

\(^ {22} \) Hisoka Maejima, *Kokuji kokubun kairyō kengisho* [Petition for script reform], 1899. Available at: [http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/992770][1] [accessed on 28.06.2017]


'Westernise' writing practice, it can be said that, for reformers, the West was perceived to be Japan's renewed Self while the East was the backward Other.

4.2. Views on the Eastern elements

In contrast, there were those who fiercely opposed the reform proposals, arguing that, by abolishing \textit{kanji} and \textit{kanbun}, the country would lose access to its rich cultural heritage and obfuscate communication. The conservatives associated Chinese writing with the traditional Eastern culture that Japan should preserve as well as with the core of communication in Japanese. For example, Miyake Setsurei opposed the abolition of Chinese characters, arguing that Japanese thoughts could not be articulated without \textit{kanji} \textsuperscript{26}. He believed that the close relationship with China that had lasted for a thousand and several hundred years had been beneficial to Japan in various ways, while describing Western civilisation as “entirely false, making a crazy fuss about things like ‘freedom’ and ‘human rights’” \textsuperscript{27}. Similarly, a scholar of Buddhism, Inoue Enryō, insisted that the Japanese nation was a nation of Chinese studies, that the Japanese were the people of Chinese studies and that the Meiji Restoration needed to be carried out with the help of Chinese studies \textsuperscript{28}. These opposing ideas for the language reform were institutionalised under \textit{Kokugokai} (National Language Association), which was founded in 1905.

The attitudes of those who opposed language reforms were in line with those engaged in the anti-Westernisation movement. Led by publicists such as Miyake Setsurei, Shiga Shigetaka, Yamaji Aizan, and Kuga Katsunan, the movement included boycotts of Western goods, a Buddhist defence of the faith against Christianity, and a backlash against industrialisation’s negative economic impact on local villages, all for the purpose of preserving the ‘Japanese spirit’ \textsuperscript{29}. In addition to the fact that they were educated in \textit{kanbun} and enjoyed the fruits of the elitism of the time, they associated the basis of the purity of the Japanese language and culture with Chinese characters while simultaneously viewing Western influence as corrupting and barbaric. Blacker \textsuperscript{30} explained that, for the conservatives, “Western learning appeared (…) to rest on a spirit and scheme of values entirely opposed to those which they conceived to be Japan’s glory and safeguard” and “to allow such studies to gain any footing in Japan would therefore be simply hastening the country’s corruption”. On the contrary, \textit{kanji}, and the associated Eastern influence covering Buddhism, Confucianism, and Chinese classics, were “invested with a mystique which made them much more than merely a form of writing, linking them with notions of thought and ideas” counterposed to those that increasingly threatened from the West \textsuperscript{31}. As Gluck \textsuperscript{32} explained, it is arguable that such an image of the West was created by the conservatives “for the purpose of self-definition” against an imagined ‘West’. In other words, for conservatives, the West was seen as a threatening ‘Other’ while the East remained the symbol of ‘Self’ with its tradition and history.

\textsuperscript{26} Setsurei Miyake, \textit{Kanji ridōsetsu} [A discourse of the advantage of Chinese characters], 1895. Available at: http://kokugomonndaikyo.sakura.ne.jp/ha/ronsou3-24.htm [accessed on 28.06/2017]
\textsuperscript{27} Setsurei Miyake, \textit{Sokoku no sugata} [Homeland], 1939. Available at: http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/1268221 [accessed on 28.06.2017].
\textsuperscript{29} Gluck, \textit{Japan’s Modern Myths}, 20.
\textsuperscript{31} Gottlieb, \textit{Kanji Politics}, 26.
\textsuperscript{32} Gluck, \textit{Japan’s Modern Myths}, 137.
4.3. East-West and Self-Other Discourse

Positions taken in the script reform debates of the Meiji period can again be examined in terms of the two ways of conceptualising the Japanese national language. Two competing visions of ‘Japaneseness’ were articulated through, on the hand, a language ‘modernised’ by Western-inspired reforms, and, on the other, a ‘traditional’ language preserved by fidelity to its Eastern elements. Whereas many reformers desired to define Japan as a modern nation and an aspiring member of a newly engaged Western civilisation, the opponents of the reforms wished to define Japan through the Eastern value framework established and preserved during the seclusion period. The language reform controversy represents Japanese identity’s oscillation between Eastern and Western poles, despite the fact that the Meiji period is often seen as the time of Japan’s extensive Westernisation.

It should be recalled that the underlying nationalist presupposition is that there should be only one ‘standard Japanese language’ that represents the country. This idea, largely, albeit not universally, adopted in many modern nation-states, was formally introduced in Japan at the time of the Meiji reforms and remains the basis of Japanese language policy to date. That is why both reformers and conservatives named their institutions Kokugo Chōsaiinkai and Kokugokai respectively, using the word ‘national language’ (kokugo). However, as has been pointed out by many scholars, including Maher and Yashiro, the social uniformity of ‘one people and one language’ is an ideological construction that negates to take into consideration the existence of Ainu and Ryūkyū with their distinct peoples, languages, and cultures, as well as the myriad regional varieties of the Japanese language. On this point, Morris-Suzuki discussed the transformation of the policy toward the Ainu and Ryūkyū peoples in the Meiji period. According to her, the exclusion rule regarding them as ‘peripheral’ and ‘barbarians’ was replaced by an assimilation rule intent on ‘Japanising’ them in order to construct a larger modern nation-state. At this time, a contrast was drawn between the ‘modern’ world and the ‘backward’ world, the first of which Japan aspired to join. Thus, it can be explained that the East-West division was incorporated into the discourse of modernity of the Meiji reforms, in which the West was seen as ‘modern’ while the East was viewed as ‘backward’.

5. Third Case: Rise of linguistic nationalism prior to and during the Pacific War

Even though language reforms had been slow, rapid social transformation remained an imperative on the political agenda and, thus, Western sciences were vigorously studied and emulated throughout the Meiji, Taisho, and the beginning of the Showa periods. In the 1930s, however, the political climate in Japan shifted with the emergence of military nationalism, bringing a significant change to “the direction and underlying motivations of language policy” Under the wartime regime, the language reform slowed down even further, as the government promoted the use of kanji as the ‘shared heritage’ of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and banned the use of Western words as ‘enemy words’. With censorship and severe limits on freedom of expression in place, the treatment of Eastern and Western linguistic elements during the Pacific War exemplified the use of language as a political tool, the meaning of which was reconstructed to suit the ideology of the time.

---

35 Tessa Carroll, Language Planning and Language Change in Japan (Surrey: Curzon, 2001), 64.
5.1. Views on the Western elements

To promote the wartime regime, the use of Western loanwords was actively avoided as *tekiseigo* or *tekikokugo* (enemy words). Words of English origin were replaced by ‘Japanese’ words, in Sino-Japanese-style loan translation in most cases. However, no restriction was imposed on Western words imported through loan translation in Sino-Japanese (*wasei kango* or *shinkango*), mainly during the Meiji period, such as *minshushugi* (democracy), *tetsugaku* (philosophy), and *yakyū* (baseball), despite their Western origin. As part of the wartime language policy, English language instruction was also halted. Books and newspapers were censored by the governmental institutions to ensure no Western words were used in publications.

However, even during these years of strict banning, it is questionable how much of an effect the restriction on Western loanwords had on the actual use of language. Kanno compared the number of loanwords of Western origin, also known as Western loanwords (*gairaigo*), used in Japanese elementary school textbooks between 1904 and 1941, looking at those published in 1904, 1910, 1918, 1933, and 1941. Despite the fact that the textbooks published in 1933 and 1941 were heavily influenced by military rule, the total number of *gairaigo* increased continually between 1904 and 1941. This suggests that the discourse of *tekiseigo*, as well as the East-West demarcation in discourse, were not so much about the actual use of words as about the association of certain Western words and values with the foreignness or evil of the enemy.

5.2. Views on the Eastern elements

While hostile discourse against Western influence in Japan was promoted, the valorisation of Eastern influence was renewed under the idea of the Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere. Chinese characters were redefined as ‘traditional’ and ‘specific’ to the Japanese nation that was to lead the sphere, despite their Chinese origins. Following the Manchuria Incident in 1931, the language reform to limit the use of *kanji* was halted. It has been explained as “partly because of the need to use many characters for Chinese place names and personal names that were not common in Japan”, but also because of “the value of Chinese characters as the repository of Japanese history, culture, and ultimately the Japanese spirit”. For Gottlieb, Chinese characters and the historical script system were “the object of veneration” and, thus, attempts to alter the existing script system, the repository of so much tradition, were deemed equivalent to a violation of the national policy itself.

It has also been argued by a number of scholars, including Miller and Gottlieb, that one of the key discourses used in language planning during the wartime was the reinvented version of the aforementioned belief of *kotodama*. The basic concept of *kotodama* used during the war period has been explained by Gottlieb as “a kind of mystical spirit in some way inherent in the Japanese language and intimately linked to the national polity”.

38 Carroll, *Language Planning and Language Change in Japan*, 65.
40 Roy Andrew Miller, *Japan’s Modern Myth: The Language and Beyond* (New York: Weatherhill, 1982).
Similarly, Miller\(^{43}\) pointed to the reinvention of the idea of *kotoage* (raising words). The term *kotoage* was often used in the expression ‘a land where *kotoage* is not done’ that meant in *Man’yōshū* (c. 759) “that words having reference to anything that cannot be carried out are not lightly uttered”. According to Miller\(^{44}\), this concept of *kotoage* was reinterpreted in the 1930s in order to describe Japan as ‘the divine country whose people do not speak out’, turning the idea into “a bogus justification for the suppression of freely expressed opinion”. This also shows that the discourse on language was largely based on the top-down linguistic policy of the government of the time.

Carroll\(^{45}\) analysed the overall aim of the wartime government as “re-aligning Japan politically and culturally to re-emphasise the common links between Japan and China against the West”. Such a discourse is comparable to the reference to the Indo-European language family to justify British colonialism that emphasised the “affinity between Europeans, Persians, and Indians”.\(^{46}\) Further to this observation, this paper argued that the wartime discourse on the ‘East’ was more than just a re-emphasis of the links between Japan and China, as the concept of the East was redefined as ‘a sphere that belonged to Japan’ rather than ‘a sphere to which Japan belonged’, a notion reinforced in order to counterpose it to the West as the ‘enemy’.

### 5.3. East-West and Self-Other discourse

Language was, thus, recruited for political ends in the wartime period both as a justification of the military agenda, the establishment of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and as a symbol of national defence through the ban on the use of Western languages and words. As a result, views on Eastern and Western elements in language dramatically changed. On the one hand, Chinese characters, which were once seen as the embodiment of Japanese backwardness by reformers, were redefined as a national symbol. On the other hand, Western loanwords, which were once seen as the symbol of civilisation and development, were labelled as ‘enemy words’, underlining the foreignness of Western influence. In spite of the significant changes in the political and social climate observed in Japan during this period, the organising force of an ‘East-West’ dichotomy endured during the Pacific War, as evidenced by the contrasting policy regarding the use of *kanji* and Western loanwords. It can be submitted that the East-West discourse was refashioned into another Self-Other binary between allies (subordinates) and enemies.

### 6. Fourth Case: Popularisation of *nihonjinron* and returning criticism against Western loanwords

The end of the Second World War would mark another milestone for Japanese linguistic attitudes. War devastation and democratisation under American guidance led to yet another dramatic social transformation in which Japan sought to redefine itself once again. The characteristics of the post-war debates on language can be observed largely in two temporal blocks. The immediate post-war period saw the rapid advancement of language reform as part of the democratisation project. The use of English loanwords increased rapidly in Japan in part because the image of the West was renewed to something more positive and in part because American influence grew in Japan through the occupation under the General Head

---

\(^{43}\) Miller, *Japan’s Modern Myth*, 256–257.

\(^{44}\) Miller, *Japan’s Modern Myth*, 297.

\(^{45}\) Carroll, *Language Planning and Language Change in Japan*, 65.

Quarters (GHQ) as well as the general global supremacy of American culture. After a few decades of post-war reconstruction and democratisation, however, there was a general revival of nationalistic sentiment supported by the Japanese economic boom. As the presence of Western loanwords in Japanese became increasingly noticeable, this led to a new backlash against the rapidly expanding use of loanwords as well as the Westernisation of Japan in general. In considering this shift in the discourse on Western linguistic elements, it is worth noting that, during the post-war period, the role of the mass media grew rapidly alongside technological developments, changing the nature of language-related discussions by magnifying the voices of the general public that added themselves to the usual government-led top-down linguistic debates.

6.1. Views on the Western elements

The idea of Westernisation again triumphed in the post-war years, as it was seen to be synonymous with democratisation and a denial of the nationalistic wartime past. Language reform carried out in the post-war period was, to a large extent, in continuity with the Meiji modernisation period, including some quite radical proposals. The novelist Shiga Naoya proposed in his essay in a journal Kaizen (Improvement) in 1946 that Japanese should be abolished, as it was an “incomplete” language, and replaced by French, as it was “the most beautiful language of all”.47 The media industry also turned to script reform. The Yomiuri Shinbun newspaper published an editorial entitled Kokugo no Minshuka (The Democratisation of the National Language) on 18 February 1946, calling for the adoption of Roman alphabet as the national script, while another column emphasised the fact that the newspaper had cut the use of kanji to make it easier to read and understand. It should be highlighted that we find in both Shiga’s proposal and the call in the Yomiuri Shinbun an aspiration for change, represented by the terms of ‘improvement’ and ‘democratisation’ that are associated with Western elements of the language.

During this period, the GHQ also submitted to General MacArthur a recommendation to replace Japanese orthography with the Roman alphabet, arguing that the existing writing system was an obstacle to democracy. Following up on this recommendation, there was a pilot project to use a Roman alphabet-only script for elementary education. This project researched the scholarly performance of the students who had received instruction in the Roman alphabet rather than in the conventional script with kanji and kana. Unger observed that the findings of this project “strongly suggested that Japanese children could achieve more academically if they did not have to learn kanji than if they did” although there was no “conclusive proof”.48 With the improving image of the West and growing dominance of American culture in Japan, the use of gairaigo increased dramatically. For example, the number of gairaigo entries in an annual dictionary of neologisms, Gendai Yōgo no Kiso Chisiki, rose from 399 in 1955 to 1,502 in 197549. Such an intake of English loanwords was described by Passin50 as being as significant as the massive borrowing from Chinese in the Asuka (538-710) and Nara periods (710-794). Thus, the idea of the West was again being incorporated into the Japanese linguistic identity through the association with the democratisation and economic development of Japan.

---

47 Naoya Shiga, “Kokugo Mondai” [National Language Problem], Kaizen [Improvement], April 1946.
However, the rapid penetration of Western culture also led to a backlash, particularly after a few decades of intensive post-war reconstruction. This resulted in a public mood favourable to defending Japaneseness against the rapidly growing Western influence. The so-called nihonjinron (theories of Japaneseness) literature attracted significant attention both in academia and in public alike from around the 1970s. Nihonjinron often refers to discussions in various fields to characterise the nature of Japanese uniqueness, with critics indicting such claims as tendentious in affirming a singularity and homogeneity of Japanese culture and language that lacks a supporting “analysis of the structural factors”. As Dale observed, nihonjinron provided an arena for an “endless discussion on differences between Japan and the West”. On this point, Maher and Macdonald also argued, “all too often, literature about Japan focuses on what is different about it, how it can be compared or contrasted with Other, particularly ‘Western’ nations”. It can be explained that this contrast between Japan and the West was based on the discourse on Japan's particularity, in which Japan as a 'particular' country was compared to the West as a 'general' concept. From this point of view, the Japan-West dichotomy could be seen as a variant of the East-West discourse. The popularity of nihonjinron, thus, exemplifies the persistence of the ‘East-West’ dichotomy in the Japanese Self-Other identity discourse in the post-war period.

6.2. Views on the Eastern elements

Following defeat in the war, Chinese characters were thereafter “imbued with a mystique linking them to nationalist values, characters were now spoken of by some as having in some way contributed to the evils of the war”. As a result, the once halted language reform process now accelerated, and recognition of the official status of the genbun itchi style was symbolised by its use in the drafting of the new constitution in 1946. The new government embraced the idea of language reform, and the Kokugo Kenkyūjo (National Language Research Institute) was founded with governmental funding “at a time when the nation was desperately short of resources”, underlining the high importance the government placed on language reform. After the establishment of the Research Institute, a series of reforms were carried out including the issue of the Tōyō Kanji List (List of Characters of General Use) in 1946 and the Jōyō Kanji List (List of Characters of Regular Use) in 1981, further followed by “revised recommendations on modern kana usage” in 1986 and on the writing of loanwords in 1991, thereby completing a series of major language reform projects.

By the 1970s, however, the public mood began to change with a revival of nationalistic sentiment and the popularity of the discourse on the Japanese uniqueness in the nihonjinron literature. McKenzie pointed out that the Japanese language played a central role in the nihonjinron literature. Miller further argued that, in the context of nihonjinron, the belief of kotodama was once again reinterpreted as “the idea that this somehow unique Japanese language [is] inextricably bound up with the essence of the Japanese national spirit and must never be tampered with on that account”. At this occasion, kanji and Sino-Japanese words were reinvented as an essential part of the Japanese cultural and linguistic identity. It

54 Gottlieb, Kanji Politics, 121.
55 Frank James, Daniels, “Japanese Officialdom and the Language”, EAJS Bulletin 9, no. 22 (1976), 22.
57 Miller, Japan’s Modern Myth, 127.
has even been pointed out that the *nihonjinron* literature claimed that *kanji* actually helped people understand the meaning of the words they had never heard of before\(^{58}\).

### 6.3. East-West and Self-Other discourse

Ito\(^{59}\) observes that the distinction between Japan and the West introduced by the *nihonjinron* observed that the distinction between Japan and the West introduced by the *nihonjinron* literature remained a key idea in contemporary Japanese society and was closely linked to the contrapuntal notion of ‘Japan’ and ‘other’ or ‘us’ and ‘them’. This perspective is observable today in the debates on the use of *gairaigo*, in which the use of Western loanwords is actively contested while Sino-Japanese loans are accepted as part of the Japanese language, creating a clear psychological demarcation between *wago* (native Japanese vocabulary) and *kango* (Sino-Japanese loans) on one side and *gairaigo* on the other\(^{60}\). Through the examination of newspaper discourse on the use of Western loanwords between 1990 and 2010, Hosokawa\(^{61}\) pointed out that the term *nihongo* tended to be expressed as synonymous to *kanji*, *kango*, and *kanbun*, while *gairaigo* was expressed as synonymous to a foreign language, English, and *yokomoji* (horizontally written letters). This tendency was observed regardless of whether the use of loanwords was criticised or praised. In both cases, the recurrent contrast between the East and the West was the key to identifying the ideal conditions of the Japanese language. It should also be pointed out the increase of *gairaigo* in the news media is often contrasted with the decline of the competence to understand *kanji*, again delineating the ‘East-West’ dichotomy with frequent references to the loss of *kotodama*. The following extracts from a nation-wide newspaper *Asahi Shimbun*\(^{62}\) are typical of this discourse:

*Inobēshon* [innovation], *terewāku* [tele-work], *ajia gētouei* [Asia gateway], *raibu tōku* [live talk], *kantorī aidentitī* [country identity] (...) What on earth do they mean? Abe’s speech is not beautiful. Mr. Prime Minister, Yamato [an antiquated way of calling Japan] is the land ‘protected by kotodama’ (30 September 2006).

*Katakanago* threatens the country of *kotodama*.

Comment: Kotodama refers to the magical power believed to reside in language. Walking down the street, one should notice that there are many katakanago and feel concerned about the future of nihongo. (...) (16 April 1997).

As can be seen from the extracts above, the *kotodama* discourse has evolved again today in reference to the overuse of Western loanwords as well as the loss of the traditional form of the Japanese language. Yet, once again, we can observe the Western-Eastern discourse at work in the above extracts with *kotodama* symbolising the Japanese linguistic identity associated with the nation in contrast to foreign Western elements.

---

\(^{58}\) Miller, *Japan’s Modern Myth*, 190-192.


7. Conclusion

This paper examined discussions on the Japanese language at four milestone moments in the recent history, shedding light on the shifting significations attributed to interactions with the East and the West. The vision of the Japanese language and nation has been continually changing in accordance with the social, political, and economic contexts as well as changing discourses surrounding them. However, the analysis revealed a continuity of the belief of the need for a uniform language of Japan. The idea of the common Japanese language is often expressed through the word *kokugo* and supported by the majority of the participants in language-related discussions; although, in reality, linguistic diversity always existed. Furthermore, there has also been a recurrent tendency to define the Japanese language within a dichotomous structure between the East and the West. Accordingly, praise and criticisms in language-related discussions have tended to focus on ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ elements of the language.

From the point of view of sociolinguistics, this paper suggested that, in constructing a modern nation-state, the concept of a national language has incorporated the East-West division into the Self-Other discourse. In one moment ‘Eastern’ elements play a role of the Self in contrast to the Other symbolised by ‘Western’ elements while in another, the relation between the two is reversed. The associations of Eastern and Western elements in each period are never stable, reflecting the general images towards the ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ countries in relation to Japan. The distinction between the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ has concurrently drawn boundaries between the ‘national’ and ‘foreign’ as well as between ‘Self’ and ‘Other’. It can, therefore, be concluded that the seemingly heterogeneous debates on language and identity in the recent history of Japan can be understood through the persistent conceptual demarcation between East and West.
References


